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
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EUROPEANIZATION OF DEFENSE: PROSPECTS OF CONSENSUS?

Peter Schmidt

December 7, 1984

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PREFACE

This study discusses the prospects of consensus among the West European countries on a policy of "Europeanization" in defense. It represents a first effort to find a realistic framework for a more detailed study about the issue of "Europeanization," which is an area of concern for the Rand Corporation and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen (West Germany). This work was supported in part by The Ford Foundation and Thyssen-Stiftung.

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SUMMARY

The concept of "Europeanization" of defense has seen renewed interest in the last few years. However, there are many important differences in security views that are of special importance because the European system of states requires a real consensus to change the current security and defense structure.

This discussion distinguishes four models: the "European approach," the "two pillar approach," the "transnational cooperation approach," and the "diffusion approach." Whether any of these approaches has a chance of realization may be explored by an examination of: (1) the motives, impulses, and aims behind the general public debate; (2) the attitudes of European elites; (3) the general political-strategic interests of important European states; and (4) the history of efforts toward "Europeanization."

The variety of incentives and motives behind the goal of "Europeanization" can hardly lead to a consensus for the first of the models: Controversial ideas exist about the differences with the United States in the overall strategy toward the East; it is uncertain whether Europe has enough resources to play a much more self-sufficient role in defense matters; there is no common threat perception, and different understandings and assessments of the general idea of deterrence characterize the debate.

The analysis of a poll of nominees for the European community parliament and a comparative security elite poll also reveal important differences. In the case of nominees for the European parliament the preferred models are the "two pillar approach" and the "NATO model." There are also major differences among countries. The nominees from the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and Luxembourg prefer the status quo, but many advocates of the "two pillar approach" are to be found in Belgium, France, and to some degree in Great Britain.

The desire to create a more independent Europe faces disagreements about Europe's role. Furthermore, countries disagree on how much national sovereignty they are willing to relinquish. The Belgians,

Italians, and Germans are more disposed to give up national sovereignty in the field of defense; the Danes, French, and Irish are strong advocates of national sovereignty in defense matters. Finally, in spite of many differences in details, most of the national security elites believe that each country's security can be guaranteed only in close alliance with the United States and within the framework of NATO. "A viable or well defined West-European security alternative to the Atlantic Alliance does not exist."¹

Several structural problems cause conflicts between the United States and Europe, but there are also different security interests among the European countries. At least to some degree, competing interests in Europe are still "pacified" in the security structure within which the United States is inextricably enmeshed. The history of attempts toward "Europeanization" shows that the advocates of each alternative have had to face at least four problems:

- Many countries still have difficulty trusting West Germany, and a reworking of power relations within Europe would lead to a strengthening of West Germany's position.
- A European nuclear power inside or outside NATO would have to decide who has access to the nuclear trigger. This would become a problem not only among the West European states but also within the wider international community.
- A European defense structure would probably also cause East-West relations to deteriorate.
- The classic pro-Atlantic school of thought is still very strong and opposes changes.

A realistic approach has therefore to be confined to an attempt to strengthen European influence within the Alliance and to increase the responsibility of the European states within a transnational cooperation approach. Several areas of possible closer cooperation among the Europeans have arisen; each, however, has its own problems and

¹Carsten Soerensen, Ian Lehmann, Ronald Inglehart, and Jacques-Rene Rabier, "A European Security Policy? The Attitudes of Candidates for the European Parliament," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, April 1980, p. 369.

limitations: military-strategic and tactical-operational concepts, development of force structures, and arms cooperation. In looking for a stable organizational framework for all these efforts, the West European Union (WEU) could play a greater role than hitherto.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to The Rand Corporation for providing me with the facilities needed to prepare this paper. It was written during a 10 month leave from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen (West Germany). The visit was supported in part by the Thyssen and the Ford Foundation. I am grateful for the critical comments that I received from Christopher Bowie, Konrad Kellen, and James Wendt. Horst Mendershausen's strategy of combining hard criticism with encouragement was especially helpful. I have tried to deal with their suggestions where possible. Any remaining errors are, of course, mine.

At the end I have to express my appreciation to James Thomson for his permanent encouragement and his organizing the exchange between the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik and The Rand Corporation. For me it was a very pleasant and profitable program.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Europeanization" has become an important issue in the debate on security policy, especially in France and West Germany. It can be found in the general public political debate and in many official and semi-official statements. However, as is often the case, when political concepts acquire a magic glitter, they suffer from a lack of distinctness and consistency. Not only is there the question of the motives of the advocates of Europeanization, but there are also different concepts concerning the institutionalization of a new structure. Finally, many contradictory political hopes are involved.

It is difficult to define precisely what people mean when they speak about "Europeanization." At a general level the advocates of this concept desire a political process in Europe that would lead the European states to have greater influence in political decisions related to their security. In particular, the idea is to have a stronger voice in relations with the United States. The special political content of such a policy, however, is controversial. Some have in mind to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance; others believe in a more or less autonomous European defense structure and want to weaken or even cut the traditional Atlantic ties in security matters; still other advocates of "Europeanization" aim at overcoming the division of Europe into two blocs; and finally, some see "Europeanization" as an instrument for avoiding the perceived danger of a neutralized Europe. Even the geographical scope within which this policy should take place is not clear. Some believe that only European NATO states should be included, others have the members of the European Community in mind, and some even discuss the involvement of Eastern bloc countries.

A brief look at the issue of "Europeanization" gives the impression that one important shortcoming of the debate is the lack of a careful analysis of the limitations involved. One limitation is that any kind of "Europeanization" requires the possibility of a real consensus among the European states when making decisions. Not one of the three principal states, the UK, France, and West Germany, has enough power to achieve an

uncontested leading position. If there is no consensus, the prospect for a common European defense structure depends principally on *outside* influence.¹ Only the United States has the capability to change the structure of relations among the European countries. For example, a policy of isolation in the United States, motivated by the idea of forcing the Europeans to get unified in defense, would be a challenge to the European states. Such a dramatic step might not produce the intended results. It could create shock waves in Europe with unpredictable outcomes, such as a split between those attempting to contain the Soviet Union and those attempting to accommodate it. But there have been no decisive changes in American politics that could lead to such a change in policy.² Gradual changes on the American side are still possible. Some important nonofficial proposals look toward a change of the current policy toward Europe.³ At present, however, official policy in the United States emphasizes strengthening the current structure more than remodeling it. At least it is not an active purpose to change the structure of inter-European relations.

The possible effect of changes in U.S. policy are not the subject here. Rather, the following analysis will focus on the problem of whether there is a viable consensus on any policy of "Europeanization" in defense matters in Europe.

First of all, four approaches to "Europeanization" are distinguished: (1) the "European approach," (2) the "two pillar approach," (3) the "transnational cooperation approach," and (4) the

¹Stanley Hoffmann made the same point for the case of a common European Foreign Policy (see "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" in Wolfram F. Hanreider (ed.), *The United States and Europe: Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspectives*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974, p. 102.

²There is theoretically a political opportunity for the Soviet Union to influence European policy, but the prerequisite would be that Moscow change almost its whole political view of the international system.

³To mention only four examples: Henry Kissinger, "A Plan to Reshape NATO," *Time*, March 5, 1984, pp. 20-24; Melvynn B. Krauss, "De-Americanize European Defense," *The New York Times*, December 11, 1983, p. E 21; James Oliver Goldsborough, *Rebel Europe: How America Can Live with a Changing Continent*, Collier Macmillan, London, 1982; and James M. Garnett, "Theater Strategic Deterrence Reexamined," *Armed Forces and Society*, Fall 1983, pp. 26-58.

diffusion approach." Then the analysis examines (1) the motives, impulses, and aims behind the general public debate; (2) the attitudes of European elites toward the approaches; (3) the general political-strategic interests of the important European states; and (4) the history of efforts toward "Europeanization."

Table 3

SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATED EUROPEAN DEFENSE POLICY BY NATIONALITY

(Percent)

Question: The functions that I am about to describe can be performed in various ways:

1. By national governments acting independently.
 2. By national governments, through prior consultation with other European Community governments.
 3. By European Community institutions with member governments retaining the right to veto.
 4. Entirely by European Community institutions, through majority vote.
- How should each of these functions be performed in the near future?
(Responses concerning "Defense Policy")

Nation	National Government	National Government with Consultation	European Community with National Veto	European Community by Majority Vote
Belgium	0	9	33	58
Denmark	83	6	12	0
Germany	4	29	23	45
France	57	26	16	2
Ireland	75	11	7	7
Italy	9	26	16	49
Luxembourg	11	64	0	25
The Netherlands	22	41	19	18
United Kingdom	23	51	21	5
Sum	23	31	19	27

SOURCE: Soerensen et al., "European Security Policy?" p. 361.

defense matters is--with the exception of France--less stressed (see Table 4).²⁶ The Europeanization issue seems to be less urgent among

²⁶See Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Heinrich Siegmann, "Sicherheitspolitik in der Krise? Ansichten der Fuehrungsschichten in fuehnf Laendern: Vorlaeufige Ergebnisse," IIVG Papers,

Table 2

PREFERRED MILITARY SECURITY ARRANGEMENT BY NATIONALITY

(Percent)

Question: In view of all changes in the relationships among the United States, Western Europe and the Soviet Union that have taken place in the last ten years, which of the following statements comes closest to your own views of how Western Europe should provide for its military security?

1. Continue current levels of support for NATO.
2. Develop a European defense posture more independent of the United States.
3. Seek to reduce the need for a strong defense through greater accommodation with the Soviet Union.
4. Other (specify).

Nation	NATO Model	EURO Model	Accommodation Model	Other
Belgium	10	62	29	0
Denmark	68	12	20	0
Germany	63	24	14	0
France	7	53	24	15
Ireland	40	19	45	0
Italy	35	37	29	0
Luxembourg	78	15	7	0
Netherlands	40	10	35	15
United Kingdom	42	45	13	0
Sum	37	37	23	4

SOURCE: Soerensen et al., "A European Security Policy?" p. 356.

Denmark, and Luxembourg prefer the status quo, but many advocates of the "two pillar model" are to be found in Belgium, France, and to a lesser degree in Great Britain. The diffusion model obtains a majority only in Ireland and is fairly strong in the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium (see Table 2). The desire to create a more independent Europe faces fundamental disagreements as to the exact nature of the role that Europe is to assume.²⁴

The situation is even more complex when the question is introduced as to the power of the individual states within a possible new structure. This question arises within both the "two pillar" and the "European approach." Soerensen et al. distinguish among four models with different power of the individual states in the common decisionmaking processes. At one end of the scale is the national model with no supranational influence. At the other end is the majority model, within which it is possible for one or several nation states to be overruled by a majority of states. The preferences are distributed rather equally among four alternatives: the national model, the consultation model, the national veto model, and the majority model.²⁵ Again, these average numbers hide important differences. The Belgians, Italians, and Germans are more disposed toward giving up national sovereignty in the field of defense; the Danes, French, and Irish are strong advocates of national sovereignty in defense matters (see Table 3).

Within the models there are important problems to be solved if Europeanization is to become a successful concept. The old question of the position of the nation-state within the goal of Europeanization is still an open one.

The attitudes and opinions of the national security elites who are not professionally involved in European questions are even more diverse. When asked what kind of issues are most important for Western security, the respondents answer that successful arms control agreements, military balance, and cooperation between Europe and the United States in defense matters are what is important. A stronger West European cooperation in

²⁴For the votes along party lines see Soerensen et al., "A European Security Policy?" pp. 358-359.

²⁵Some polled in Great Britain and Denmark have even refused to discuss the problem outside of the NATO model.

Table 1
PREFERRED RELATIONSHIP TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
UNITED STATES BY NATIONALITY

(Percent)

Question: In the future how should the European Community develop its relationship to the superpowers?

1. More independence from both the superpowers than hitherto.
2. More coordination with the USA than hitherto.
3. More coordination with the USSR than hitherto.

Nation	More Coordination with U.S.	Preserve Status Quo	More Independence from Both	More Coordination with USSR
Belgium	5	0	89	5
Denmark	22	53	25	0
Germany	40	0	57	3
France	5	3	91	1
Ireland	19	9	73	0
Italy	17	0	83	1
Luxembourg	53	0	41	6
The Netherlands	40	11	49	0
United Kingdom	28	12	60	1
Sum	23	5	70	2

SOURCE: Soerensen et al., "A European Security Policy?" p. 354.

greater accommodation with the Soviet Union comparable to the "diffusion approach." The NATO model is as much preferred as the "two pillar approach" (both by 37 percent) and the diffusion approach is supported by 23 percent. But more important, there are great differences among the countries. The nominees from the Federal Republic of Germany,

thesis that there is a lack of consensus in relation to specific models of Europeanization.

Eastern countries and that the security of the countries be guaranteed by a political framework based, for example, on nonaggression contracts within the "diffusion approach."

In summary, the many incentives and motives behind the goal of Europeanization can hardly lead to a consensus for one of our models. However, institutional arrangements always go along with different hopes. It is not inconceivable that different and controversial goals may go along with a demand for the same new institutional structure.

THE VIEW OF ELITES

The various ideas about a more self-sufficient European defense are to be found not only in the general debate but also in the political assessment of the several models at the elite level. A poll was taken of nominees for the European parliament; then, the national security elites in important countries were considered.

In the case of the nominees for the European community the analysis of Soerensen et al. shows that these politicians share the idea of a more independent Europe; about 70 percent demand more independence from both superpowers than hitherto, only 5 percent prefer the status quo, 2 percent argue for more cooperation with the Soviet Union, and 23 percent believe in closer cooperation with the United States (see Table 1).²² The questions do not refer directly to the four approaches to Europeanization; nevertheless, these results support the general idea of Europeanization. Such a consensus exists only on the surface; comparison of the several approaches to Europeanization brings out the differences. Soerensen et al. examine three models that are comparable to the approaches of this study. The advocates of the "European" model may have favored the "two pillar approach." Soerensen et al. introduce the status quo in the form of a "NATO model," characterized by a call for greater European independence from the United States, comparable primarily to the "two pillar concept,"²³ and an approach that calls for

²²See Carsten Soerensen, Ian Lehmann, Ronald Inglehart, and Jacques-Rene Rabier, "A European Security Policy? The Attitudes of Candidates for the European Parliament," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 4/1980, pp. 347-371, and the figure on the following page.

²³Soerensen et al. do not distinguish between a "two pillar approach" and a "transnational cooperation approach." However, the introduction of one more model would only more strongly support the

at the reunification of West and East Germany. Rather, with a more distant relationship to the United States, a situation would arise in which the problem of reunification would lose its importance because the political relations between the two countries would have changed in a positive way. Opponents of deterrence and critics of the United States as the leading Western power are mostly inclined to share this view.

Critics of the United States and of deterrence can arrive at a satisfactory solution of the political problems only if they assume that the Soviet Union has no aggressive or offensive goals in Europe. If this were not the case they would have to plead for subordination under the Soviet Union. As mentioned above, a diminished threat perception is not a very strong factor alone; consequently, it determines to only a small degree the preference for one of these models. In the 1970s, detente appeared as one important reaction to a diminished threat perception, mainly within the framework of NATO. There was no strong demand for a policy of diffusion. Combined with a critical view of deterrence, however, the diminished threat perception today strengthens the "diffusion approach."

The last point is a critical view of deterrence and the arms race as an incentive for Europeanization. To replace the deterrence system, Europe must in this view reduce political tensions by promoting detente and the reduction of armaments. This view excludes the possibility of a European deterrence system as a substitute for the current system and looks to all chances for a political *modus vivendi* with the Eastern countries, especially the Soviet Union.²¹ The concrete political outcome depends on an assessment of how dangerous the current situation is. Moderate critics may prefer that the security policy of the future Europe be founded on political means as envisioned under the concept of the "civilian power of Europe" (Zivilmacht Europa) without great changes in the status quo; more extreme critics may look for much greater changes, even demanding that the new European peace order include

Policy, Spring 1983, pp. 23-38; and Martin Saeter, "Europe and the World: European Reorganization as Part of Global Restructuring," NUPI notat, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, No. 262, February 1983.

²¹See, for example, the member of the Greens in the German Bundestag, Petra K. Kelly, "Fuer ein Gruenes Europe--doch welches? Gedanken zur gegenwaertigen Europadiskussion," *Forum Europa*, July 1984.

opportunity to end perceived or alleged tendencies toward neutralization in West Germany by strengthening European self-interest in defense and protecting the basis of the current security system.¹⁹ All these ideas have to face the old problem of the basic approach to the unification of Europe. France particularly still favors a Europe of national states--and, therefore, the WEU--and there are also political forces working in favor of an integrated European defense within the European Community.

A diminished view of the threat is an important factor in the public interest in Europeanization. But more than other factors, it supports the idea of Europeanization only in combination with such other factors as a critical view of deterrence. In some cases, the goal of overcoming the separation between East and West Europe plays a role too.

One strong school of thought believes that the traditional view of the Soviet Union as an aggressive or at least an offensive power is wrong today. In this view, the USSR instead behaves like a "normal superpower;" the advocates of this position advance something like a "both-are- superpowers" argument. The international behavior of the USSR and the United States is found in many respects to be based on the same principles. Sometimes people even advance the idea of a Soviet Union in distress, whose main interest is defensive. An important element within this view is the notion that communist ideology has died within the Soviet Union. Supporters of this assumption argue that the Soviet Union is only interested in balancing the situation with its great counterpart, the United States. They argue that there ought to be much more of an "open situation" in Europe; that is, Europeans should have a much freer hand than current "official policy" gives them. Therefore, completely new security arrangements are plausible, such as a new European power consisting of West and East European countries between the superpowers. The assumption of a defensive Soviet Union allows the idea that the West and East European "non-superpowers" could separate themselves from their principals step by step, and at last leave the Warsaw Pact or NATO.²⁰ This concept does not necessarily aim

¹⁹See Hedley Bull, "European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1983, p. 874.

²⁰This idea is typical for Peter Bender, *Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters: Die Europaeisierung Europas*, Severin und Siedler, Berlin, 1981; Klaus Bloemer, "Freedom for Europe, East and West," *Foreign*

That line of argument does not determine the political and military outcome alone. It depends on the view of the threat, the estimation of deterrence, and the perceived ability of the European states to mobilize enough political and military resources for the new structure. Those who believe in deterrence speak in favor of a pure West European deterrence system; others who are critical of deterrence aim at a totally new structure based on a closer relationship with the Eastern countries and an agreement with the Soviet Union within the framework of the "diffusion approach."

The second incentive for the demand for Europeanization in defense matters is the appeal of the general idea of European unity. The basic assumption here is that Europe has the capability to mobilize enough financial, political, and military means to create a more self-sufficient Europe. This assessment is determined not only by the perceived ability of the European states but also by ideas about how much and what kinds of resources are necessary for the security of Europe. There are two main views regarding this question. In the first view, the current European military efforts are sufficient or can even be reduced without decreasing security. The group that holds this view is critical of current deterrence and military strategy. This approach replaces the concept of "military security" by the idea of "political security;" there must be some arrangement with the Soviet Union, which therefore has to be defensive by nature. Only then will the security problem be solved.

The opposite idea is that Europe has the ability to mobilize more resources for its own security. The basic structure of the Alliance with one superpower and less powerful countries produces "free rider" problems. The overwhelming capabilities of the superpower give few incentives for efforts on the part of the smaller European nation states. A defense structure with more European responsibility will improve this problem and encourage the European countries to do more for their own defense.¹⁸ Sometimes Europeanization appears as an instrument for mastering domestic problems. A more independent Europe will offer an

¹⁸See as an example Fritz Birnstiel, "Eine Europaeische Verteidigungsunion--der Weg in die Zukunft," *Europaeische Wehrkunde*, 9/1980, p. 429.

The criticism has shifted, however, from the more nationalist right to the left. The traditional arguments of DeGaulle and Franz-Josef Strauss that the American umbrella is full of holes¹⁴ is now combined with the idea that the United States will perhaps dare a limited tactical-nuclear war on the European soil with terrible consequences for Germany, as has been argued by such leading SPD members as Egon Bahr, Oskar LaFontaine, and Erhard Eppler. In the 1960s the criticism was that a reduction of the importance of American nuclear weapons in Europe furthers the danger of a "limited conventional war,"¹⁵ but a large group of people today argue that every reinforcement in the field of nuclear weapons leads to the danger of a "limited nuclear war."

This can be demonstrated in the case of the discussion about the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe. The political and military promoters of INF in Europe had in mind that when the deployment should become necessary because of the failure of the INF negotiations, these missiles would couple the security of Europe to the security of the United States.¹⁶ The deployment, however, also strengthened the idea that these missiles are an instrument for decoupling. Combined with a critical view of U.S. foreign policy, this view suggested that Europe will be the battlefield for possible superpower struggles. Within this view, Europeanization has the task of building a new military or political security structure in Europe in order to reduce this risk.¹⁷

¹⁴This kind of view is still rather strong in France (see for example Michel Manel, *L'Europe sans defense?* Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1982; the proposals of Buis and Sanguinetti made in two interviews in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, August 20, 1979, pp. 26-28; and September 10, 1979, pp. 38-39; and the interview with former Minister of the Interior Michel Poniatowski in *Expansion*, January 25, 1980, pp. 60-62).

¹⁵See William C. Cromwell, "The United States," in William C. Cromwell (ed.), *Political Problems of Atlantic Partnership: National Perspectives*, College of Europe, Bruges, 1969, pp. 71-72.

¹⁶See The Federal Minister of Defence, *White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany*, Bonn, 1983, pp. 137-147.

¹⁷See for example the statement of Egon Bahr, *Vorwaerts*, October 27, 1983, p. 12.

or by a more active role throughout the world for the European states. This assessment is especially connected with the view that the current fairly stable situation in Western Europe is threatened by the possible spillover of a conflict from the third world and the oil supply countries and is combined with a critical view of the wisdom of American policies in these regions.¹²

Beyond this criticism of the American political attitude in security matters, the public debate emphasizes a more serious problem within the Atlantic relationship, the old problem of "coupling." The question is whether it is credible that the United States would be prepared to risk its destruction to save Western Europe. The debate on this issue has many similarities with the controversies in the 1960s over the introduction of flexible response. The basic strategic assessment, however, has changed. Indeed, it is the same problem that has arisen from the question of the deployment of American Pershing IIs and cruise missiles on European soil.¹³ The political debate reminds us that there is no broadly accepted theory as to which measures lead to coupling and which to decoupling. "Nuclearists" emphasize a strong nuclear threshold in Europe with a link to the American strategic deterrence; "conventionalists" prefer to improve above all the conventional defense capabilities of NATO-Europe so as to raise the nuclear threshold. The first attitude can now be found over almost the whole political spectrum in France; the second is more characteristic of the political left in Germany and Great Britain. There is a tendency in the first case to interpret any American nuclear reduction or conventional rearmament in Europe as a sign of decoupling, whereas in the second case any increase in American nuclear weapons or reduction on the conventional side faces the same criticism. This has always been a dilemma in the Atlantic relations.

¹²See Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Elite and Mass Opinions in a Comparative Perspective," The Rand Corporation, P-7016, September 1984.

¹³The discussion about the so-called star-wars defense system of the United States has the same motivation.

- The perceived differences with the United States in the strategy toward the East, economic policies, and doubts in the general credibility and wisdom of American foreign policy.
- The perceived current or future ability of the European states to mobilize the necessary economic, financial, and political resources to play a more self-sufficient role in defense matters.
- A diminished threat perception.
- A critical view of the general idea of deterrence as a keystone of the current Alliance strategy or a negative attitude toward more specific strategic and tactical developments on the American side.

Policy differences with the United States are an important incentive for Europeanization. At a general political level, the common denominator of the current critical discussion about the United States seems to be that American foreign and defense policy is not predictable enough and is not based on a solid knowledge about the European and world situation. The shift in policy from President Carter to President Reagan and former President Carter's handling of the neutron bomb controversy in 1977-1978 are only two examples of events that helped to produce this feeling. However, the idea often springs from different political backgrounds. In Germany, for example, one finds politicians on the right who believe that President Reagan is now the partner who is able to guarantee "predictability;" these same people are afraid of the possibility of a "new Carter."¹⁰ In the political center and on the left many emphasize that it is precisely President Reagan who is responsible for producing new feelings of insecurity.¹¹ In both views, however, Europeanization has the task of smoothing over the political irresolutions in U.S. foreign policy by influencing it more powerfully

¹⁰An example is the demand of eight CSU members of the European Parliament to create a "European security system" (see *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, November 8, 1983).

¹¹See for example Horst Ehmke, "Eine Politik zur Selbstbehauptung Europas: Ueberlegungen angesichts der Entfremdung zwischen alter und Neuer Welt," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 7/1984, pp. 195-204.

- The *diffusion approach*. This approach emphasizes the process of detente.⁷ The idea of this approach is to diffuse the centers of power by weakening NATO and improving relations with the Soviet Union at the same time. Within a complex political strategy European countries would have a special task: to stop the confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers and to build a new "European Security System." The main idea is to overcome confrontation and to find--eventually--a new security structure encompassing countries in both East and West. This model has some flexibility too. Some people believe that this approach calls for withdrawal from NATO,⁸ while others see the Alliance as something like a protector of the process of diffusion.⁹

MOTIVES, IMPULSES, AND GOALS IN THE GENERAL PUBLIC DEBATE

The objective of Europeanization in the public or nonofficial debate is motivated by contradictory impulses. The French crisis in the 1960s was mainly due to the question of strategic coupling, the "credibility of the American strategic umbrella," and the demand for more French influence within the Alliance. The problems in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were about the adequacy of the European defense burden. Four critical views of the current security structure play a part today in the public assessment of the situation and tend to create tensions within the Alliance:

⁷I do not use the term "detente" in this case because this term has always been interpreted in at least two different ways: (1) A policy to stabilize the status quo by alleviating some reasons for conflicts, (2) a strategy to overcome the current security structure. The "diffusion approach" can be seen as interpretation (2) of detente policy. To some degree one can say that interpretation (1) represents the American position, whereas in West Germany (2) is stronger but not predominant.

⁸Ulrich Albrecht, "Western European Neutralism," Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith (eds.), *Disarming Europe*, London, 1982, p. 143.

⁹See for example Egon Bahr, *Vorwaerts*, April 30, 1981, p. 26.

- The *two pillar approach*. This approach would strengthen European influence within NATO by establishing two decisionmaking circles within the Alliance without changing the basic responsibilities. A separate European institutional arrangement would be created with its own joint European decisionmaking process. The basic problem of this approach is to define what organizational context could strengthen the European influence within the Alliance. Some give preference to the West European Union (WEU),⁵ others favor the European Economic Community.⁶ As in the case of the first model, a "federal solution" conflicts with the idea of a system still based on nation-states.
- The *transnational cooperation approach*. This approach aims at improving cooperation in different defense-related matters without changing either NATO or the way in which defense decisions are made among West European states. This concept would encourage practical and flexible cooperative projects among the European states. The discussion here is about more joint production of armaments, more adjustment of the tactical military concepts and the army structures, and so forth. The hope is that closer cooperation will in the long run reduce the European dependency on the United States. Each common effort of two or more European states can be included under this understanding of "Europeanization;" in particular, the reactivated French-German cooperation constitutes the background of this approach.

⁵France traditionally prefers this approach (see Uwe Nerlich, "Westeuropäische Verteidigungsidentität: "Die Dilemmas französischer Sicherheitspolitik in Westeuropa," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 8/1974, pp. 244-245).

⁶See Karl Kaiser et al., *The European Community: Progress or Decline*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1983; also Heiner Geissler, *Deutsch-französische Freundschaft--Basis fuer die europäische Einigung*: Rede auf der Veranstaltung, "20 Jahre deutsch-französischer Freundschaftsvertrag--Rueckblick und Bedeutung fuer die Gestaltung der Zukunft," am July 1, 1983 in the Karl-Arnold Bildungsstätte in Bonn-Bad Godesberg.

II. CONCEPTS OF EUROPEANIZATION

Four analytical models surface in the broad political discussion.¹ Models (1) and (4) aim at radical changes; models (2) and (3) aim at moderate changes, some of which are already in progress.

- The *European approach*. The main responsibility for security matters in this model would be vested in a centralized future European government or in the individual European nation-states working together to a greater or lesser degree. That means above all that two distinct elements of the current security structure would have to be changed: the dominance of the American nuclear-strategic guarantee in the nuclear strategy of NATO, and the presence of a large American military force in Europe. Cooperation with the United States would still be possible, but the main decisions would clearly be made in Europe. This broad definition necessarily elicits the question of what concrete kind of change is necessary for building a self-sufficient European defense. The proposals include the demand for a European nuclear force directed by all or some European states;² others only demand that France should enlarge its nuclear sanctuary to include German territory.³ The most controversial idea is the proposal that West Germany should build up its own nuclear force.⁴

¹The models are defined in a rather general way. Emphasis is put only on principal differences. If the number and complexity of the models increase, the possible consensus on one of these models necessarily diminishes.

²See the analysis of this idea by Nikolai German, *Zur Rolle und zu den Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der französischen und britischen Nuklearstreitkräfte unter absehbaren sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Rahmenbedingungen*, Ebenhausen (SWP-S 255), November 1976.

³See Michel Manel, "L'Europe des Etats Sanctuarisee," *Defense Nationale*, November 1983, pp. 37-53.

⁴See the opinions of Georges Buis and Alexandre Sanguinetti, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, August 20, 1979, pp. 26-28 and September 10, 1979, pp. 38-39.

Table 4
FACTORS OF WESTERN SECURITY
(percent)

Question: Which of the following will be most important to Western security?
(Multiple answers are possible; unweighted responses)

Factor	FRG	France	Great Britain	The Netherlands	U.S.
The military balance with the Soviet Union	13	24	15	15	20
Effective US-European cooperation	16	19	17	17	19
Improved relations with the third world	12	7	10	12	9
Strengthened economic unity in Western Europe	7	14	10	9	8
Continued contacts with the Soviet Union	19	9	17	15	14
Productive arms control talks	24	7	22	23	20
Greater defense collaboration in W. Europe	8	20	9	10	10
Don't know	8	20	9	10	10

SOURCE: Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 31.

those polled as public political debate might suggest.

Finally, this opinion poll shows that in spite of many differences in details the great majority of the national security elites holds the opinion that the security of each country can be guaranteed only in close alliance with the United States (see Table 5) and, consequently, within the framework of NATO. These security elites also do not perceive an American tendency toward isolationism; they do not believe that the United States will abandon its commitment to the defense of Western Europe within the next 5-10 years.

In conclusion, NATO still receives rather strong support, especially from national security elites. The debate on alternatives is very controversial and has not led to concepts with great consistency. As a result, changes and reforms seem possible only within the basic structure of the Atlantic Alliance. There is still a strong demand for greater European self-determination, but the conclusions drawn among different countries and political parties are very different. Although there is rather broad dissatisfaction with the present state of the Atlantic Alliance,²⁷ a majority in each country sees it as the only basis for its own security. The overall evaluation of Soerensen et al. can be used as a summary of this section:

A viable or well defined West European security alternative to the Atlantic Alliance does not exist.²⁸

Veroeffentlichungsreihe des Internationalen Instituts fuer Vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, IIVG/dp 83-107, p. 26. It is a mailed survey in five countries at the national security elite level. They have received 786 usable questionnaires.

²⁷About 2/3 of the respondents to the Science Center Berlin Mail Survey are not satisfied with the present state of the Atlantic Alliance. This phenomenon can be found in all polled countries (see Heinrich Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 11).

²⁸Soerensen et al., "A European Security Policy?" p. 369. The participants and experts in national security affairs in the Federal Republic are aware of the difference between their own demand for a fully integrated European defense policy and the chance for it. In 1980/81 63.5 percent wanted to have a fully integrated European defense policy but only 5 percent expected it would be possible within the 1980s; 76.2 percent expected a cooperative kind of integration (see

Table 5

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

(Percent)

Question: The Atlantic Alliance and related issues have become subjects of renewed discussions. What are your positions on the following statements?

(Selection: 2 of 12 options)

	Strongly agree/tend to agree				
	FRG	France	Great Britain	The Netherlands	U.S.
It is likely that the U.S. will ABANDON its commitment to the defense of Western Europe in the next 5-10 years.	7	17	10	3	3
The security of the country can be guaranteed only in close alliance with the United States.	71	81	69	81	84

SOURCE: Siegmann, "The Science Center Berlin Mail Survey," p. 14-15.

THE POLITICAL-STRATEGIC INTERESTS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Sources of Conflicts Between the United States and Europe

One important reason for the problems of the Atlantic Alliance is the change within the power structure of the world. Two developments are responsible for this. The most important change is the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower at the strategic level with the ability to intervene in many parts of the world.²⁹ This has created two problems

Dietmar Schoessler and Matthias Jung, "SIPLA-Umfrage 1980/81. Tabellenband," Arbeitsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik Universitaet Mannheim, 1982, pp. 40-41).

²⁹For the American view see Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress*, Fiscal Year 1985, Washington D.C., February 1, 1984, p. 25.

for the Alliance. First, there is the question of whether the United States is really prepared to use its strategic weapons to deter a conflict in Europe; strategic parity has raised the question of regional imbalances. Second, the threat perception of Europe and the United States have become disassociated. The United States has reacted more and more to global threats and different situations throughout the world, at the strategic level whereas the European states have developed or maintained a more or less regional view of the threat.³⁰

The other change in the power structure concerns the relationship among the allies. Europe has become increasingly stronger, especially in the economic field, without developing enough political and military power to become equal to the United States. That does not mean that Europe has become equal in the field of military production and development; in that field the United States has an ongoing superiority in important areas of modern weapon technology.³¹ However, the problem has been that within the emerging power structure, Europe has failed to attain a position corresponding to its economic and political resources. The tension between European "power options" and the inability to realize them may be one important motive for European discontent. These emerging trends must lead to divergent ideas of how to cope with the current security problems.

Seen in retrospect, the Harmel report of 1967 was a keystone in the search for a new political strategy. The report stated that detente and defense must be the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance.³² That report

³⁰See Henry A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1965, pp. 231-32.

³¹The European cooperation within the EUROGROUP reflected this fear of U.S. economic dominance, particularly in high technology (see Roger Facer, "The Atlantic Alliance and Europe: Part III, Weapons Procurement in Europe--Capabilities and Choices," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 108, London, 1975, p. 31).

³²Harmel's first concept for the report was not dominated by the idea of combining detente and defense as the main functions of the Alliance but of how to organize a European "caucus" within the Alliance. See Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*, Harper & Row, New York, 1970, p. 143. Harlan Cleveland represented the United States in the NATO Council from 1965 to 1969.

also marked the beginning of important changes in German policy toward the East. The possibility arose of accepting the status quo in Europe as a matter of fact, with the consequence that interest in important problems of relations between East and West diminished in Europe. It was believed that the problem of regional imbalance in a time of strategic balance could be solved by reducing regional tensions (regional detente). The "Ostvertraege," the CSCE negotiations, and the talks about troop reductions in Vienna (MBFR) were part of this strategy.

European participation within the Alliance could be strengthened by greater European cooperation in several fields and a bigger European share in the defense of Europe. Eurogroup and Independent European Program Group created the institutional framework, the European Defense Improving Program was the principal expression for more European efforts.

Another problem of the 1960s was that of nuclear decisionmaking. Who has to make the crucial decisions in using nuclear weapons in a conflict and what role can the Europeans play? After the failure of a Multilateral Force the Americans offered European participation in nuclear planning, leading to the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

However, that did not lead to a much greater voice in the alliance. Because of the nuclear predominance of the United States, the European endeavors and the American offer could not and were not supposed to change the fundamental decision structures. Europe still wanted to be under the American nuclear umbrella. This necessarily gave America a central position, and the United States could not renounce the right to make the decision regarding employment of nuclear weapons.³³

The strategy of regional detente, to diminish the problem of the regional imbalance in a time of strategic balance, raised questions too. Although the negotiations and contracts produced the feeling of a rather secure political situation in Europe, not only were the military

³³Walter Lippmann made this point clearly in 1962: "We are at odds with de Gaulle because in fact his ambition to take the leadership of Europe is irreconcilable with our vital need to retain the ultimate power in nuclear affairs. We must have that power because we have the ultimate responsibility." (Walter Lippmann, *Western Unity and the Common Market*, Hamilton, London, 1962, p. 30.)

problems not solved, but Europe and NATO had to face the new challenge produced by regional detente. Pierre Hassner illustrated that point when he writing: "The main challenge to European security is the process of detente and cooperation, because it is the main source of change and because by promoting communication between opposing systems it confronts each of them with its own contradictions."³⁴

In the beginning, the concept of regional detente had positive effects on the Atlantic Alliance because the negotiations that followed between the two blocs--especially on MBFR and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)--called for political coordination.³⁵ But the necessity for more coordination also made the differences between the partners more evident. On a regional level, the Europeans have seen a decrease in political tensions between the blocs after a period of detente, but increasing conflicts have marked relations between the superpowers. The reason for this conflict was that the Soviet Union did not look upon detente as a status quo agreement on arms and political activities in the third world, but rather improved its position without great western countermeasures. This Soviet attitude was regarded in the United States as a breach of the tacit agreement during the period of detente.

As various NATO official statements show, Europeans agreed that detente was indivisible, but in reality the European countries were not prepared to completely support an overall containment strategy toward the Soviet Union. The United States tended to expand the conflict between East and West to symbolic areas (for example, the boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow and the Afghanistan resolution) and also to the economic sector (for example the policy of sanctions), but there are strong tendencies in Europe to limit the conflicts between East and West to specific areas and not to add to the list of conflicts.³⁶ These

³⁴Pierre Hassner "Europe: Old Conflicts, New Rules," *Orbis*, 3/1973, p. 910.

³⁵See Peter Schmidt, *Wirkungen der "militaerischen Entspannung" auf die Verteidigungspolitik der Natostaaten. Der Fall MBFR*, Tuduv, Muenchen, 1983, pp. 88-95.

³⁶For discussion of the problem of economic sanctions see Friedemann Mueller, "Economic Sanctions in the East-West Conflict," *Aussenpolitik* (English version), 1/1984, pp. 67-79.

different political-strategic concepts arising from a different political development on the regional and the superpower level are an important source of the tensions between some European NATO countries and the United States.

Another source of conflict involves questions of military strategy. Because of the American lead in military technology the Americans have always been the moving force in this field. During the debate on the Enhanced Radiation Warhead, the disagreements over the dual track decision, and the recent debate about the so-called "star-wars" plans, the basic question of coupling arose again as a political issue. From the American point of view the European standpoint is inconsistent. Whether they intended to strengthen their forces in Europe or to reduce them, the criticism was always the same: decoupling.³⁷ The Europeans tend to interpret new technologies as a threat to the balance of interests within the Alliance, and many believe that new military means could deteriorate relationships with the East.

DIFFERENT INTERESTS WITHIN EUROPE

The complex structure of conflicts between Europe and the United States has clouded the view. Some people have become enamored with the prospect of a nascent European Union; others have developed the idea that the concept of detente could be used to break down the confrontation between the two blocs and to create, following the "diffusion approach," a totally new security structure including Eastern and Western states; and others have argued for various combinations. The traditional transatlantic view, more than ever, has had to compete with several alternatives.

This "global evolution" conceals ongoing differences among the European states. Each European nation defines its security interests in its own way with different results. William Cromwell points out these different interests behind the national defense efforts. In West Germany he sees "acute vulnerability and need for Alliance support;" in France, the aim "to achieve status and greater independence of action

³⁷See Falk Bomsdorf, "Sicherheitsinteressen Westeuropas in der SALT-II-Anhoerung. Ein dokumentarischer Bericht ueber die Beratung des Vertragswerks im Auswaertigen Ausschuss des amerikanischen Senats," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 2/1980, pp. 49-62.

both within and outside the Alliance;" in Great Britain, the desire "to maintain a global role and influence over Western policy and United States policy in particular;" and in the case of France and Great Britain, "residual four-power responsibility for the unification of Germany requiring a continuing political-military presence in order to exercise influence in an eventual European settlement."³⁸ These principles have been fairly stable during the last decades, which does not necessarily mean that the way to fulfill these principles has not changed. Especially in the case of France, it is obvious that something has happened. This change represents more an adaptation to new political circumstances than a principal change. Detente has not decreased but increased these differences, because the West European states do not have the same perspectives on detente.³⁹ At least to some degree, the United States is still not only the "protector" of Europe but also the "pacifier" of competing security interests among the European states.⁴⁰

On the American side the ongoing discussion in Europe about "security alternatives," the growing perception of threats outside of Europe, and the reluctance of the European states to assist the United States in coping with this perceived threat have produced the American demand that the Europeans bear a greater share of the burden and the risks in Europe. Naturally this American demand creates more political problems and, within some European states, must lead to even more pressures to develop an alternative to the current security structure. But what about a possible consensus on the European side? Is there perhaps a coincidence not of principles but of means for carrying out different goals?

³⁸William C. Cromwell, "The United States," p. 62.

³⁹See Stanley Hoffmann, "Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?" p. 92.

⁴⁰See Uwe Nerlich, "Western Europe's Relations with the United States," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, p. 88. See also Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1984, pp. 64-82.

III. A SHORT HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS

The history of initiatives about a new security and defense structure aimed at greater European integration shows that they are concentrated around the "two pillar" and the "transnational cooperation approach." Only the first proposal aimed at a pure European defense, revealing the deep-rooted acceptance of NATO. Basically Europeans have considered the following alternatives:

- A pure European defense structure.
- A fusion of French and British nuclear capabilities in a common "European atomic pillar" within the Alliance.
- The extension of the French sanctuary to German soil.
- The improvement of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the conventional military field.
- The creation of a European consensus-building framework besides NATO.

The first alternative can be filed away with the statement of Raymond Aron, made in 1974 but still valid, that there is no European identity in the field of defense because the partners of France within the European Community reject--not without reason--a defense structure that is not in accordance with NATO or at least connected with NATO.¹ This opinion is shared by many today.² That does not mean that there is no official rhetoric, quite the opposite. Even the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose country prevented the formation of the European Defense Community in 1954, stressed in 1973 the need for a purely European defense structure.³ During a session of the West European Union he proposed

¹See Raymond Aron, "Detente et condominium: partenaires ou rivaux?" *Le Figaro*, January 8, 1974, p. 26.

²See for example the statements of Alfred Grosser reported by Kurt Becker, "Furcht vor den unruhigen Deutschen", *Die Zeit*, December 23, 1983, S. 2; and Pierre Lelouche, "Europe and Her Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, p. 824.

³See Jean Klein, "Mythes et realites de la defense de l'Europe," *Politique Etrangere*, 2/1983, pp. 320-321.

that this organization could be the place forum all related questions should be discussed. However, the French were not successful. The German defense minister, Georg Leber, rejected this idea at once, and the British and the German Ministers for Foreign Affairs objected later and pointed out that the WEU was not the right place to speak about those questions. This reaction reflected the common assessment of Great Britain and the Federal Republic that on political and military grounds a security policy without the United States is out of the question. Michel Jobert, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, recognized this and emphasized later that the presence of U.S. troops on the European continent was indispensable to demonstrate the mutual assistance pact of NATO.⁴

The French, for a long time reluctant to stress NATO's importance, have emphasized that their security depends mainly on the framework of the Alliance.⁵ It is only because of this change in official French security policy that the current debate on reviving the Western European Union can take place.⁶ This development on the French side is due to interesting changes within the political culture, especially concerning the view of the threat and the necessity of defense.⁷ The traditional feature of an independent French security policy is, however, still strong. The several initiatives for better European defense integration by the French government therefore produces not only hopes but also confusion and doubts.⁸

⁴See Jean Klein, "Mythes et Realites", p. 321.

⁵President Mitterand of France, in a speech at The Hague on February 7, 1984, made the point explicitly that no European Alliance can replace the Atlantic Alliance and that no European force can be a substitute for the presence of the Americans.

⁶See the clear statement of "Staatssekretaer" Alois Mertes (Foreign Office): "There is no European alternative to the Atlantic Alliance." (Alois Mertes, "Das Buendnis hat sich bewaehrt," *Die Zeit*, March 16, 1984, p. 4) and Erich Hauser, "Neu entfachte Liebe zum Dornroeschen Westeuropaeische Union," *Frankfurter Rundschau*, March 7, 1984.

⁷There are several new books written by diplomats, political advisers and military personnel calling for a breakdown of the classical "French approach" in security matters. I want to mention only two: the study of the French diplomat Henri Froment-Meurice, *Une puissance nommee Europe*, Julliard, Paris, 1984; and philosopher Andre Glucksmann, *Philosophie der Abschreckung*, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart, 1984.

⁸For the different reactions on the several initiatives concerning a "European Union" and a close cooperation in defense matters see Heinz

The decisive point of French policy is the central political desire of France to maintain political ties with Germany and the Atlantic Alliance. Not only during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing,⁹ but even more so under the new President Francois Mitterand, this objective is one of the keystones of French security policy. The new policy seems to be motivated by the coincidence of an increased threat perception and the fear that West Germany will drift eastward. In the French view this development threatens its independence. The old threat was seen as a superpower arrangement at European expense; today they see the danger in Germany's political development. The fear of losing the military area on the immediate front, historically rooted in the contract of Rapallo, and the political freedom of action within the Alliance¹⁰ explains the French double strategy in security policy toward the Federal Republic: On the one side there is the offer to cooperate in defense and security matters, including the previously taboo issue of tactical-nuclear weapons, and a strong support of the double track decision of NATO; on the other side there is still the classic demand for independence.¹¹ Both policies are meant to alleviate French concerns about a "shifting Federal Republic."

The British have always been reluctant to support a European "caucus." This attitude still seems to predominate today. Defense Minister Michael Heseltine answered the question of whether progress can be made toward a truly European defense in an interview for "Le Point":

Britain believes that NATO is the major guarantee of European security.¹²

Stadlmann, "Bruesseler Skepsis gegenueber den deutsch-franzoesischen Europa-Plaenen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 2, 1984.

⁹See Uwe Nerlich, "Westeuropaeische Verteidigungsidentitaet: Die Dilemmas franzoesischer Sicherheitspolitik in Westeuropa," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 8/1974, p. 241.

¹⁰See for this point David Yost, "The Socialists in the French Defense Debate," *Armed Forces and Society*, Winter 1982, pp. 168-172.

¹¹See Renata Frisch-Bournazel, "Deutschlands Rolle in Europa aus Pariser Sicht," *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung*, 2/1983, esp. p. 33; and Michael Krelle, "Frankreichs Sicherheitspolitik unter Mitterand," *Aussenpolitik*, No. 1/1984, pp. 54-66.

¹²*Le Point*, April 8, 1984, p. 28.

The reasons for these British and French attitudes on security are manifold. They are founded on an established and deep-rooted network of security views and accepted structures. Thus, the problems with a European defense structure are as follows:

- Each alternative European security structure raises again the difficult question of power relations within Europe and would be inextricably enmeshed with a stronger West German position Germany within the European concert. France and Great Britain would have to pay this bill or West Germany would have to accept the status of a second-rank power relative to France and Great Britain.¹³
- A European nuclear power inside or outside NATO would have to decide who has access to the nuclear trigger. This would become a problem not only among the West European states but also within the wider international community because West Germany has forever renounced control of nuclear weapons.¹⁴

¹³See Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945*, Macmillan, London, 1980, p. 286. Josef Joffe describes the advantages of the current security system frankly: "For the first time in European history, the German problem was reduced to stable proportions: Germany was now neither too strong nor too weak; there was security for Germany as well as against Germany. The advantages of such a halcyon state of affairs are not lightly abandoned." (Josef Joffe, "German Defense Policy: Novel Solutions and Enduring Dilemmas," in Gregory Flynn (ed.), *The Internal Fabric of Western Security*, Croom Helm, London, 1981, p. 89). Helmut Schmidt made the proposal recently that France should take the lead in a French-German security tandem (see his speech in the Bundestag, June 28, 1984, p. 5603). Elder statesmen seem to be less reluctant to subordinate than politicians in power.

¹⁴An often forgotten dimension is history. Forty years after D-Day, Tyler Marshall wrote: "Despite the passage of nearly two generations since the war ended, lingering wartime sentiments still constitute an important, if little-mentioned, subcurrent that continues to influence political decision-making." ("W. Germans Still Bearing Stain of War," *Los Angeles Times*, May 27, 1984, p. 1).

- A European defense structure would also cause East-West relations to deteriorate. The Soviet Union would--at least for a certain time--fight strongly against this kind of effort. It would not be possible to pursue detente at the same time.¹⁵
- The classic pro-Atlantic school of thought is still very strong. For political and military reasons only the United States is able to effectively countervail Soviet power in Europe by being militarily present and providing the strategic umbrella.

The second possibility, a joint British and French nuclear force within the Alliance, also has very little chance to be implemented. At one time this idea was accepted by the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Michel Jobert. A short time later, however, President Giscard d'Estaing called this initiative a diplomatic mistake. French strategic thinking, characterized by the idea of a French "sanctuary" and the special ties between Great Britain and the United States, prevented the realization of this idea. At the end of the 1970s there were again some discussions about the possibility of a common French and British nuclear power. Great Britain was forced to make a decision about the future of its own strategic nuclear force, but the decision made was in favor of the Trident system in accordance with the traditional special relationship with the United States.¹⁶ That soon brought the debate to an end.¹⁷

¹⁵This problem was clearly expressed by the French President Giscard d'Estaing during a press conference of May 21, 1975. There he said that under current circumstances--without a European Political Union--these kinds of projects should be renounced, because they would produce understandable fears on the Soviet side (see *Le Monde*, May 25, 1975). A recent example of this point is the Soviet campaign against the decision of the WEU to cancel the last remaining limitations on conventional weapons for the FRG.

¹⁶Great Britain was the principal foreign architect of the U.S. commitment to Western Europe (see Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power in Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, September/December 1982, p. 160).

¹⁷British Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine made this point in answering the question, What are the prospects for French-British nuclear cooperation? "The major obstacle here is clearly the fact that we have opted for the U.S. Trident missiles to modernize our strategic forces.

But the positive aspect of Great Britain and France remaining nuclear powers is that it can lead to more European responsibility in defense matters. Both countries are on the way to modernizing their nuclear weapons at considerable cost. Some observers believe that this modernization could provide the basis for a future European nuclear force. At present such a prophecy is rather risky. The decision of both powers to maintain their nuclear forces makes it possible to hold open the option of a solution with more European responsibility.¹⁸ That is of some importance for two reasons: The mere possibility has a positive effect on the bargaining power of the Europeans within the Alliance,¹⁹ and the European arsenal could be necessary if the American guarantee were ever in doubt.²⁰

The third alternative, an extension of the French nuclear guarantee to German soil, received some attention during the presidency of Giscard d'Estaing. But the ambition of bringing Germany and France closer together by introducing the new notion of an "enlarged sanctuary" did not succeed.²¹ The current reform of the French military structure is not an exception. The emphasis is still on a *national* nuclear

As you know, Trident is the result of lengthy cooperation with the United States." (*Le Point*, April 8, 1984, p. 29.)

¹⁸See, for example the proposals of Juergen Todenhoefer (Christian Democratic Party, West Germany), "Eine europaeische Atomstreitmacht als zweite Saeule," *Die Welt*, April 17, 1984; and the more moderate approach of Pierre Lelouche, "Europe and Her Defense," p. 832.

¹⁹The question is whether a rather improbable alternative is a bargaining chip. The European alternative is not very credible within the range of current nuclear strategic thinking. But strategic thinking is in flux, and a combination of a "New European Strategy" and new political factors in Europe and the United States would give this alternative some credibility.

²⁰Another point concerns a political-psychological effect. Under the conditions of the current nuclear debate a positive point is that not only the United States but also two European countries have to make nuclear decisions. Otherwise the criticism of the American side would be probably even more negative. A similar point made by NATO Secretary General Peter Carrington in an interview was that success in giving the defense a more European character would make it easier for the Europeans to believe that it is their affair (*Le Figaro*, July 24, 1984, p. 5).

²¹See Francois Voiron, "La Politique militaire sous le septanat du President Giscard d'Estaing, Memoire presentee vue de l'obtention du diplome", Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneve, 1982, p. 108.

deterrence strategy.²² The rapid deployment force may improve the flexibility of the conventional forces to strengthen NATO defense if the French president should decide to join the defense of the FRG. Certainly, the extension of the nuclear guarantee by France would have a positive symbolic effect on the Alliance. But the quality and quantity of the French nuclear arsenal and the French doctrine of use for tactical-nuclear weapons would not provide much benefit.²³

The fourth alternative, that of strengthening the bilateral and multilateral cooperation of NATO Europe, is a traditional issue in Europe. These efforts go back to the early 1960s when it was decided to create a European armament cooperation,²⁴ and there have always been attempts to develop and produce different types of weapons in a cooperative manner.²⁵ The creation of the so-called Eurogroup at the end of the 1960s and the Independent Group in 1975 have served rather limited goals and have had limited success.

The fifth way, to create a European consensus-building framework besides NATO, has often been combined with special models of European defense. There have been several initiatives concerning the European Community²⁶ and the West European Union (WEU). The WEU framework is

²²In spite of that Helmut Schmidt proposed that France should extend its nuclear sanctuary to German soil (speech in the Deutscher Bundestag, June 28, 1984, p. 56030).

²³Since 1978 there have been five Pluton regiments available. Each of the five regiments has six reloadable launchers. The exact number of Pluton missiles is not clear because some launchers are held in reserve and others are based in military schools and France has never published an official figure. In 1992, Pluton will be replaced by the Hades missile with greater yields, penetration aids, potentially greater accuracy, and longer range (350 km). The French Air Force has five squadrons of planes for tactical-nuclear missions (Jaguar A and Mirage IIIE). In 1981 the Navy received the tactical-nuclear warhead AN-52 for 36 Super Etendards.

²⁴See the report of the council of the WEU, December 6, 1962.

²⁵For a list of military-industrial advanced technology projects in Western Europe, 1960-1975, see Horst Mendershausen, *Outlook on Western Solidarity: Political Relations in the Atlantic Alliance System*, The Rand Corporation, R-1512-PR, June 1976, pp. 141-146.

²⁶At the level of the European Parliament there were attempts to spur a common policy in the field of arms cooperation (see the reports of Egon Alfred Klepsch "Bericht ueber die gemeinsamen europaeischen Interessen, Risiken und Beduerfnisse im Bereich Sicherheit," Europaeisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1984- 1985, No. 1-80/84, 1-80/84/A, and 1-80/84/B; and Adam Fergusson, "Bericht ueber die

preferred by the French mainly because this institution is not connected with the entangling integration process at the level of the European Community. This French attitude makes it rather unlikely that the EC initiatives will be implemented.

The same motive surfaced in 1960 when France proposed that the European Community members had to improve their capabilities to work together in the field of foreign and defense policies. This initiative led to the discussions about the so-called Fouchet plans,²⁷ which were rejected in 1962 because important members of the European Community became aware of the basic French motive to counter the integration process at the European level and to strengthen the national governments. Furthermore, it was believed that the plans could challenge NATO.²⁸

Ruestungsbeschaffung im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Industriepolitik und die Waffenverkaufe," Europaeisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente, 1983-84, No. 1-455/83). Secretary of State Hans Dietrich Genscher (FRG) initiated the so-called Genscher-Columbo initiative aiming at integrating the European Political Cooperation in the EC and creating a European Council for security-related questions (see Lambert V.J. Croux, "Bericht ueber den von den Regierungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik vorgelegten Entwurf einer Europaeischen Akte," Europaeisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1982-83, No. 1-1328/82).

²⁷Christian Fouchet was the French diplomat who headed the study committee of the Economic Community concerned with this initiative.

²⁸See Robert Bloes, *Le "Plan Fouchet" et le probleme de l'Europe politique*, Bruessel, 1970.

IV. A REALISTIC APPROACH

Considering the debate on the content of the objective of "Europeanization" and the structure of the political strategic interests outlined here, a realistic policy must be confined to the attempt to strengthen European influence in the Alliance within a *"transnational cooperation approach."* Today even the French government shares this opinion. NATO has not hampered either a greater European share of responsibility or a policy of detente. Moreover, the detente policy was supported by the existence of NATO.¹ There are enough possibilities within this system to pursue a flexible security policy.

At the European level, this situation allows only a technique of "piecemeal engineering" (Karl Popper). Such a decision strategy has--beyond the fact that there are no likely alternatives--several advantages:

- The process of integration in Europe would not become overcharged with too many problems.
- The structure of fairly stable security arrangements would not be in danger.
- The question of more cooperation in defense matters could be discussed and settled step by step in accordance with the general European integration process.

Within such a policy, the renewed interest of France in cooperating more closely with the Federal Republic of Germany could be used as a "moving force" to improve the state of European integration. Recent political statements seem to signal that France is prepared to undertake some important steps.

¹See Werner Link, *Der Ost-West-Konflikt. Die Organisation der internationalen Beziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1980, p. 135.

- The announced reform of the French army is based on the idea of making the future structure better suited for the defense of Germany.
- There is some willingness to discuss even the tactical-nuclear doctrines of the French forces.
- There is a strong demand for more cooperation in arms development and production.

These political ideas are only a part of the general overall preparedness of the French government to work for a closer cooperation in European defense matters. This still declaratory French policy could come to binding commitments. It is unlikely that they will lead to an "integrated European structure," or the integration of the French in the military structure of NATO; nevertheless, the outcome could be better than the current situation.

AREAS OF COOPERATION WITHIN THE "TRANSNATIONAL APPROACH"

Three areas are important:

- Military-strategic and tactical-operational concepts.
- Development of force structures.
- Arms cooperation.

The differences between France and Germany since France left the military integrated structure of NATO were an important obstacle to a closer relationship. From the German point of view the problem of the French tactical-nuclear forces is crucial. However, it is hard to believe that the purpose of these weapons--the trigger for the French strategic forces--can be discussed. They remain "national weapons." The French development in the area of strategy aims at "nuclearization" and not at "conventionalization,"² as NATO does. This divergent development

²France plans to increase the total number of nuclear warheads from 285 in 1983 to about 930 in the mid-1990s (see Robbin Laird, "French Nuclear Forces in the 1980s and the 1990s," *Comparative Strategy*, 4/1984, p. 406).

can lead to a sensible result only when there is a rough division of labor within a more or less harmonized strategy.

In the area of the development of force structures, success is possible only when there is a French force structure with the capability of implementing some important tasks within the general concept of Forward Defense. It is not necessary to ask whether France will come back to the integrated military structure of NATO; that is out of the question. But it is of interest to determine what real options the French forces will have in the future in strengthening their conventional military defense and deterrence of the Alliance. The new French rapid deployment force will not really be ready for use in forward battle, even in a reserve role, because there is no support by NATO forces and facilities.³

Because of the pressures on the current force structures especially for financial reasons, there is a need to consolidate and reform the current structures to coordinate financial resources and military necessities. In a political debate on financial problems in Great Britain on this question some analysts expressed the opinion that it is necessary to reorganize the British forces in favor of the Navy.⁴ Such a policy would be dangerous for political and military reasons if it is not in harmony with a common concept for NATO.

Arms cooperation has an indirect and long-term relation to defense problems and a stronger European position within the Alliance. European armament cooperation is primarily a matter of commercial competition between Europe and the United States. A better European integration would have certain advantages:

³See the critical report in *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, "Glanz und Wirklichkeit der franzoesischen 'Blitz-Truppe,'" Oct. 1, 1983, p. 4. For an evaluation of the Force d'action rapide see David Yost, *France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe*, The EAI Papers, No. 7, The European American Institute for Security Research, Marina del Rey, California, Spring 1984, pp. 87-103.

⁴See Michael Chicester and John Wilkinson, *The Uncertain Ally: British Defense Policy 1960-1990*, Gower, Aldershot, 1982.

- The common production of arms is not merely an economic, technical, and political process. Such a policy could harmonize the tactical and operational concepts of the partners. At least this cooperation would lead to better mutual knowledge in this field.
- There is an opportunity to reduce the costs per item.⁵
- The European dependence on American technology could be reduced (especially in the area of the "emerging technologies" where a dramatic falling behind of Europe would produce new problems). The internal financial and economic pressures give this kind of cooperation a high priority. The French government in particular seems to aim primarily at this kind of effort,⁶ and even the British have an increasing interest in this kind of collaboration.⁷

THE QUESTION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

It would be a sign of progress, of course, if the French forces became more integrated in forward defense and the European countries were successful in the fields of arms cooperation and the harmonizing of the future force structures. But even such successes would lack continuity if there were no common structure where the mutual *and conflicting* interests could be discussed. That is a necessity not only

⁵But there must always be a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether an "Atlantic cooperation" would not be better than a purely European cooperation.

⁶See, for example the statement of the French Secretary of Defense, Charles Hernu, before the WEU Assembly, December 1, 1983. There he brought up three problems: (1) Collaboration in the field of armaments, (2) Negotiations on arms limitations, and (3) France's military effort (see Europe, Agence Internationale, No. 3742 (n.s.), Friday, December 2, 1983, p. 3).

⁷See the interview with Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine in *Le Point*, April 8, 1984, p. 28, the approach of the British "defense estimates" discussed in *Financial Times*, May 15, 1984, p. 24 ("The Rising Costs of Defense"); and the summary of David Yost, *Models of European Security*, p. 81: "With Atlanticism pre-eminent, the only defense union concepts that seem to have much resonance in Britain are those that suggest financial savings through weapons and equipment standardization, interoperability, and rationalization."

for the situation in Europe but also for the Atlantic relationship. From the American side, there are often contradictory European interests that do not permit a common solution. A more clearly defined "European standpoint" could improve this situation.

The only organizations where one can find a European debate on defense issues inclusive of France are the West European Union and the Independent European Program Group (IEPG). The cooperation within the WEU has regularly had the following problems:

- From the German and British view this institution was in dangerous competition with NATO cooperation.
- The Federal Republic has had an additional critical point. One function of the WEU was the control of German arms production, which is discriminatory in the circumstances.⁸

Perhaps the WEU framework can play some role in the process of European cooperation in defense matters. And, in fact, the French president recently started an initiative to reactivate this dormant institution.⁹ But three questions have to be posed in assessing the prospects of this initiative:

- What would be the American reaction toward this policy?¹⁰
- How far would France go in accepting closer connections not only with the political but also with the military side of the Alliance?
- What are the interests on the British side? Would this kind of policy be seen as a danger to the special relationship between Great Britain and the United States?¹¹

⁸This problem was solved with the decision of the Council of the WEU on June 27, 1984 to cancel the last restrictions for conventional arms production in West Germany (strategic bombers and missiles).

⁹A working group of the WEU was installed to check the prospects of a revival of the WEU. The report was published June 12, 1984.

¹⁰The first American reaction was quite positive. The conditions for the positive assessment are quite clear: There may not be a rival institution to NATO but there may be a contribution to the alleviation of the inner imbalance of the Alliance.

¹¹The British Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, has endorsed the initiative (see "Mitterand's Initiative," *Financial Times*, May 29, 1984, p. 14).

The IEPG has had only minor success up to this time.¹² Not a single cooperative project has been initiated or implemented within its framework. One reason is that European arms cooperation occurs always in competition with Atlantic cooperation, a problem that remains unsolved. But there are also some intrinsic difficulties in bringing about successful arms cooperation:

- National doctrines and concepts in the field of military action make it hard to find a project that fits all interests.
- The industrial structures among the countries are very different.
- There are different ideas and concepts on how and where the arms could be sold (arms export).
- Each country has its own defense plan with different procurement phases. That also makes common procurement difficult.

These obstacles can only lead to the conclusion that arms cooperation is not manageable on a day-to-day basis but has to be embedded in a long-standing effort within a rather stable institutional setting. Above all there is the need to understand cooperation not only as a technical and economic process of arms production but also as an effort to find a better understanding in general defense matters.

One obvious conclusion is that initiatives aiming at better defense cooperation within the framework of the European Economic Community¹³ are rather unlikely to succeed. There will be a tendency

¹²See Stephen Kirby "The Independent Programme Group: The Failure of Low-Profile High-Politics," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. XVIII, 1979/1980, pp. 175-196; and Johan Joergen Holst, "Die unabhaenige europaeische Programmgruppe: Zusammenarbeit und Sicherheit des Westens," *NATO-Brief*, 2/1981, pp. 8-11.

¹³See the so-called Fergusson Report (Bericht im Namen des Politischen Ausschusses ueber die Ruestungsbeschaffung im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Industriepolitik und die Waffenkaeufe. Berichterstatter: Adam Fergusson, Europaeische Gemeinschaften. Europaeisches Parlament, Sitzungsdokumente 1983-1984 vom 27. Juni 1983, Dokument 1-455/83).

toward the separation of defense issues in the strict sense from overall political and economic issues. The Economic Community is not sufficiently strong to make the necessary decisions.

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